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EUTHANIZING TE PROFOUNDLY MENTALLY
INCAPACITATED:
A SIMPLE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Bernard A. Eskandari*
I. Introduction
Throughout history, the killing of those that society
deems unfit has gone in and out of fashion. Typically, the
targets of such programs are the mentally disabled, the
physically disabled, and the insane. Sexual orientation,
religious or political beliefs, and propensity for criminality
may become part of the criteria as well, depending on
society's commitment and fervor for such a program. The
apparent reason for killing the unfit is to create a superior
population-a citizenry that is both mentally and
physically superior-while reducing the incidence of those
in society that constitute a drain-those who ostensibly
take more from society than they contribute. Underlying
this bestial policy is a seductive economic argument- if a
society's goal is to maximize wealth, it must be sensible
policy to remove those from society who do not contribute
any wealth and in fact only consume it. Certainly the
wealth of society is increased if the net detractors are
"removed."
This comment will begin by discussing a few
societies that have implemented programs to do away with
those deemed undesirable. Part I contends that it is
unnecessary for the purposes of this paper to draw a bright-
line rule between what is considered a low quality life and
what is not, but will use the profoundly mentally
incapacitated as an example of what policy-makers might
deem a low quality life. Part IV discusses several widely
* J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Michigan.
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published rationales for euthanizing the profoundly
mentally incapacitated. Part V argues that even if it is
seemingly economically advantageous to euthanize the
profoundly mentally incapacitated, there are both economic
reasons as well as non-economic reasons for why it is not a
beneficial practice for society to implement (i.e. the
"Against Law and Economics" aspect).
II. A Few Different Historical Approaches to Dealing
with Low Quality Lives
In the last hundred years, Nazi Germany
implemented the most robust euthanasia program aimed at
maintaining purity. Amid the turmoil of World War 11,
Hitler's T-4 "euthanasia" program was implemented to
eliminate "life unworthy of life." Germany's mentally
disabled were the first to be deliberately exterminated;
"defective" children were removed from their families and
taken to hospitals where they were exterminated. The
program was soon expanded to include adults in order to
prevent any "deficient" member of the German "master
race" from breeding and passing on their inferiority.' What
the Third Reich first did to the defenseless mentally
disabled would soon include other defenseless people who
were labeled "subhuman" or "useless eaters." One
rationale for the T-4 program-or at least one rationale
given by the government to the German public-was
largely economic. Nazi propaganda posters made the
' Wikipedia Encyclopedia, T-4 Euthanasia Program,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-4_EuthanasiaProgram (last visited
Dec. 21, 2004).
2 Ellen Myers, The Mentally Retarded The Least of our Brethren,
http://www.creationism.org/csshs/v07nlp26.htm (citing Robert H.
Jackson, The Hadamar Trial p. ii. (1949)) (last visited Dec. 23, 2004).
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German population aware that a person suffering from a
hereditary defect costs the public 60,000 Reichmarks
during his lifetime. 3 The implicit meaning behind these
posters was, of course, that the German people were better
off without the "hereditary defective."
4
Unfortunately, the United States is not without its
own embarrassing history. While the United States has not
resorted to euthanizing those deemed worthless, it has
participated in mass sterilization. The mentally disabled
have been subjected to unnecessary institutionalization and,
as a result of the eugenics movement, involuntary
sterilization. The idea behind this initiative rested on the
notion that sterilizing large numbers of "defective" people
would prevent the perpetuation of targeted defects and
genetic diseases. 5 Although the mentally ill and disabled
were the most frequent victims of this program, unwed
mothers and boys in reformatories and orphanages were
also included, especially if they were judged to be of low
intelligence. 6  In total, an estimated 60,000 to 100,000
3 See app. A.
4 Between 1933 and 1939, unemployment in Germany dropped from
six million (50% of the German population) to three hundred thousand.
The Nazis and the German Economy,
http://www.historyleamingsite.co.uk/nazis-and-the-german-economy.
htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2004). Of course, this statistic is largely Nazi
propaganda because women were not included in the unemployment
statistics. The unemployed were forced to take whatever work they
were given or be classified as "work shy" and placed in a concentration
camp. Id. Jews lost citizenship, and 1.4 million men were conscripted.
Id.
- See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (concluding that "[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough").
6 Breeding Better Citizens: Forced Sterilization in the U.S. A Hidden
Chapter of American History (ABC News television broadcast, Mar.
22, 2000). Race was also a factor, as a large number of Southern
blacks were sterilized. Id. These sterilizations became known as the
3
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people were sterilized in the United States.7
Sterilization aside, the mentally disabled are still
not treated particularly well in the United States.
Nightmarish accounts of staff beatings and sexual abuse of
residents in institutions are not uncommon. 8 Shockingly, it
is reported that at one Washington, D.C. area institution,
the dentist was actually a veterinarian. 9 While the United
States has come a long way since the days of forced
sterilizations, no one can seriously argue it has come nearly
far enough.
The Netherlands is not only a western trendsetter in
legalizing drugs and prostitution, but also in allowing
doctors to kill people who want to die. Since 2001, a
medical practitioner in the Netherlands may euthanize a
terminally ill patient who unequivocally expresses a well-
"Mississippi appendectomies." Id.
' Id. State governors have recently started apologizing for past
eugenics laws that led to forced sterilizations. For example, Oregon
Govenor John Kitzhaber apologized for the more than 2,500 forced
sterilizations from 1917 to 1983, which included girls in reform school,
people in mental institutions, and poor women selected by welfare
workers. See Governor Apologizes for Forced Sterilizations, THE
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 3, 2002, at B2. One year later,
Govenor Gray Davis apologized for the more than 19,000 involuntary
sterilizations that took place in California mostly before World War II.
See Davis Apologizes for Sterilizations, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 2003, at A4.
8 Louie Estrada, Advocate for Mentally Retarded Found Inspiration in
Misfortune, THE WASH. POST, May 30, 2004, at C10.
9 Id. Some experts believe institutional abuse is so permanent and
unshakable that they have proposed euthanasia for the more severely
retarded persons. A Time to Take Sides, Center on Human Policy,
School of Education, Syracuse University, 1979,
http://soeweb.syr.edu/thechp/TAKESIDES.htm (last visited Dec. 8,
2004) (citing HEIFETZ & MANGEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE: A
NEUROSURGEON SPEAKS OF DEATH WITH CANDOR (Putnam 1975)).
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informed desire to die and who is in unbearable pain,
provided that there are no measures available to make the
patient's suffering bearable. 10 As a result, doctors in the
Netherlands perform around 3,000 "mercy killings" a
year." Outrage over allowing doctors to engage in such
activity was immediate. Opponents unsurprisingly put
forward slippery slope arguments-voluntary euthanasia
today, involuntary euthanasia tomorrow. It looks as though
the opponents might not have been too far off; a hospital in
the Netherlands recently proposed guidelines for mercy
killings of terminally ill newborns and has already
performed such procedures. 12
Performing mercy killings on babies thus raises the
question of whether it is ever appropriate to euthanize a
person who is incapable of deciding for themselves
whether he or she wants to end his or her life. Those in the
Netherlands who support baby euthanasia say that the
guidelines would mirror the guidelines used for adult
patients suffering with great pain and no hope for relief and
would provide that euthanasia of a newborn should be
acceptable when the child's medical team and independent
doctors agree that her pain cannot be eased and when there
is no hope for improvement. 13  Proponents in the
Netherlands point to several examples of afflictions that
may trigger newborn euthanasia: extremely premature
births, brain damage, spina bifida, and epidermosis bullosa
(a rare blistering illness). 14 Dutch officials estimate that
'0 PETER SINGER, RETHmIKiNG LIFE AND DEATH, 146 (St. Martin's
Press 1995).
n Id. at 143.
12 Toby Sterling, Netherlands Hospital Euthanizes Babies, A.P. NEWS,
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involuntary euthanasia would be applicable in only about
ten cases a year. 15
I. What is a Low Quality Life?
This comment will not discuss real-world criteria
for determining a low quality life. Exact line drawing is
not the focus of this comment; the goal is not to make a
policy determination of who falls below the threshold.
Rather, for the purposes of this comment, a low quality life
will be one that ostensibly appears in its totality to cost
society more than it provides. The Nazis, twentieth century
American policy makers, and Dutch officials all dealt with
or are dealing with this issue and each has come to a
different conclusion.' 6  Differentiating between a low
quality life and one that is not low quality does not advance
this comment's purpose, although I do wonder whether any
life is low quality. The relevant question is whether it
would be economically advantageous for society to
terminate low quality lives, assuming we could determine
which lives are low quality and which are not. If some
infallible machine could do the calculations, is this
something we would want to do? Purely for the purpose of
discussion, the reader should consider the following as
examples of lives possibly qualifying as low quality:
someone who is in a permanent vegetative state ("PVS"),
15Id.
16 Ultrasounds are routinely performed during pregnancy and can detect
birth defects such as cleft palate. A study in Israel revealed that after
detection for cleft palate, 95.8% of affected fetuses were aborted.
Gregory Wolbring, The Silenced Targets, Inside Human Genetics and
Genomics, available at http://www.mindfu11y.org/GE/GE4/Silenced-
Targets-WolbringSIS30janO2.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2004).
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someone born with most of his brain missing, 17 or someone
who is profoundly mentally disabled.18  All three
afflictions refer to someone who effectively has no brain
function. For the purposes of this comment, I will use the
generic, non-scientific term "profoundly mentally
incapacitated" to refer to all three and those similarly
afflicted.
IV. Rationale for Terminating Low Quality Lives
Before we begin, I want to consider the factors that
are likely to influence society's treatment of low quality
lives. While people seem to be genetically programmed to
feel protective toward children, we do not seem to feel as
protective towards the mentally disabled. This is
evidenced by the number of mentally disabled patients in
state and private institutions. Such "putting away" behavior
is analogous to the institutionalization of the elderly-as it
17 This condition is known as anencephaly. Babies born with this
condition only have a brain stem and are only capable of reflex actions.
See SINGER, supra note 10, at 39. People who are in a PVS or who
suffer from anencephaly are not conscious and have no hope of
regaining consciousness because the conscious portion of the brain is
either dead or completely missing. Id. PVS is a condition where
patients are considered to have permanently lost the function of their
cerebral cortex. All voluntary reactions or behavioral responses
reflecting consciousness, volition, or emotion at the cerebral cortical
level are absent. Although a PVS patient does not experience any
observable pain or suffering, she remains permanently unaware. See
Christian J. Borthwick, The Permanent Vegetative State: Ethical Crux,
Medical Fiction? 12 ISSUES L. & MED. 167, 168-69 (1996).
's Those that are profoundly mentally retarded have an IQ in the range
of 0-24 and a mental age of 2 years or less. Such people are incapable
of guarding themselves against common physical dangers. See
Wikipedia Encyclopedia, Mental Retardation,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retarded (last visited Dec. 13, 2004).
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seems our love for them diminishes as they get older. 19 It
makes biological sense that our instinctive feeling of
protection towards children would not apply to the elderly
or the profoundly mentally incapacitated. For "[i]nclusive
fitness is unlikely to be promoted by the devotion of huge
resources to the survival of persons who, by reason of
[mental incapacitation or old age], are not reproductively or
otherwise productive, either actually or (like children)
potentially.,
20
If society's goal is to maximize wealth, then it
becomes rather straightforward why euthanizing lives that
provide negative value to society makes sense. If we were
to remove each negative valued life in society, there would
be a net gain in wealth. For example, imagine we have a
society of three people and we are able to determine that
person A contributes 20 units of wealth to society, person B
contributes 10 units of wealth to society, and person C
contributes -5 units of wealth to society (consumes 5 units
of wealth from society). With person C in this society, the
total wealth is 25 units; whereas without person C, the total
wealth is 30 units. So if our goal is to maximize society's
wealth, we are better off without person C. This logic is
analogous to the Nazi propaganda poster discussed
above. 21 This simple model, however, fails to take into
account the countless variables discussed below.
This is not a novel understanding of human value.
For example, in extremely poor societies where food is
scarce, the cost of feeding an elderly person may mean the
starvation of a child. In such a society, it is unremarkable
22that the elderly will be left to starve or even be murdered.
19 RICHARD A. POsNER, AGING AND OLD AGE, 203 (1995).
20 id.
21 See app. A.
22 POSNER, supra note 19, at 205. "Some 20 percent of primitive
8
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Moreover, it is not uncommon for the elderly in these
societies to acquiesce to society's death-to-the-elderly
norm and even go to their death merrily. 23 When resources
are extremely scarce, the death of one person often means
the continued life of another. Therefore, under dire
circumstances, calculating the value of each person's life is
inevitable.
A. Abortion as a Substitute
Empirical data tending to support or refute the
policy of euthanizing low quality lives is hard to come by.
Steven Levitt and John Donohue investigate the next best
thing in a paper entitled "The Impact of Legalized Abortion
on Crime. 24  According to their research, since 1991
homicide rates have dropped 40% with violent crime and
property crime each dropping more than 30%.25 Why?
Levitt and Donahue contend that the drop in crime is not
the result of more jails and better police, 26 but assert that it
societies" killed their old people. Id. at 203 n.4.
231d. at 203 (citing Lucy MAir, AFRICAN SOCIEES, 197 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1974)). It has become popular understanding that Eskimos
set adrift their elderly on ice floes to die, though there is some debate
as to how widespread this practice was. See Straight Dope, Science
Advisory Board, Did Eskimos put their elderly on ice floes to die?,
May 4, 2004,
http://www.straightdope.com/mailbag/meskimoicefloe.html (last
visited Dec. 14, 2004) (clarifying that it was really the Yuits and Inuits
who engaged in this practice during times of famine).
24 John J. Donohue Ill & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized
Abortion on Crime. (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. W8004, Nov. 2000), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-249508
(last visited Sept. 10, 2005).25 Id. at 1.
26 Id. at 2.
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Levitt and Donahue argue that abortion helps lower
crime for two reasons. First, women who have abortions
are those most at risk to give birth to children who might
commit crime. 29 Studies show that while teenagers,
unmarried women, and the economically disadvantaged are
all more likely to have abortions, they are also more likely
to have children who are at higher risk for committing
crimes during adolescence.3 0  Second, legalized abortion
allows mothers "to delay childbearing if the current
conditions are suboptimal."' 31 This means children will be
born into better environments, thereby reducing future
criminality. 32  Drawing on this premise, Levitt and
Donahue conclude that crime in 1997 was 15-25% lower
than it would have been had abortion been illegal. 33
Although Levitt and Donahue's paper has been
criticized, 4 they provide an interesting argument for
terminating potentially low quality lives.3 5 It is one of the
few empirical studies that supports the contention that
27 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28 See Donohue & Levitt, supra note 24, at 2.




13 Id. at 34.
34 Randall K. O'Bannon & Laura Antkowiak, Abortion Link to Crime
Decreased Debunked,
http://www.nrlc.org/news/2001/NRL06/randylaura.html (last visited
Dec. 23, 2004) (discussing John Lott and John Whitley's reservations
about the statistical analysis in Levitt and Donahue's paper).
35 For the purposes of this paper, abortion is no different than
euthanizing a person outside the womb. The concept in the end is the
same-there are people who are potentially bad for society and society
would be better off if they were no longer around.
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society can be made better, in at least one respect, if we
prevent certain "high risk" lives from coming into being.
Most people would agree that lower crime is a good thing.
It is not clear, however, whether society would truly
be better off without these high-propensity-for-crime
babies even if one accepts the notion that crime rates will
certainly be lowered. It is highly probable that many of
those who fall into the high-propensity-for-crime baby
category will not commit crimes, but will become
contributing members of society. It is not inconceivable
that an aborted child might have one day discovered the
cure for AIDS or cancer. To this end, Levitt and
Donohue's paper does nothing to prove that terminating
low quality lives will make society better. If accurate, it
only demonstrates that terminating low quality lives could
make society better.
B. Cost to Care for the Profoundly Mentally
Incapacitated
The cost to institutionalize the mentally disabled is
high. The state of California alone spends $600 million
annually.36 The annual cost to care for a resident in one
California state development center is just over $160,000.31
In Washington, D.C., the cost of providing services to the
36 Ed Pope, Bill Would Phase Out Centers for Retarded, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, July 23, 2001, available at http://www.psych-
health.com/dds30.htm.
37 Association of Regional Center Agencies, History of the
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mentally retarded and developmentally disabled averages
approximately $120,000 per year per resident.38 Of the
approximately six million mentally retarded individuals in
the United States, 39 roughly 10% are in institutions.
40
Even assuming the average cost for the institutional care of
one mentally disabled person in the United States is only
$50,000 per year, the total cost of institutionalization is an
astounding $30 billion per year. As for patients in a
permanent vegetative state (PVS), the number is slightly
less daunting. A survey of care costs for PVS patients in a
nursing facility suggested a range from $126,000 to
$180,000 per year per patient.41 Based on this, a rough
approximation of the total costs in the United States for the
care of adults and children in a permanent vegetative state
is around $4 billion.
42
38 D.C. Auditor, Cost of Care for the District's Mentally Retarded and
Developmentally Disabled Exceeded $300 Million Over a Three-Year
Period, (Dec. 18, 2000) http://www.dcwatch.com/auditor/audit030.htm
(last visited Dec. 14, 2004). And remember, this is the same area that
has been known to employ veterinarians instead of dentists. See supra,
note 9 and accompanying text. One can only imagine the cost if
patients were receiving proper care.39 Disability Statistics,
http://codi.buffalo.edu/graph_based/.demographics/.statistics (last
visited Dec. 14, 2004).
40 See Dr. Joseph F. Smith Medical Library, Mental Retardation,
http://www.chclibrary.org/micromed/00056550.btml (last visited Dec.
23, 2004).
41 Borthwick, supra note 17, at 170-171.
42 Id. It is important to note, however, that this figure is misleading.
Typically, a patient enters PVS after a long bout with some other
illness like dementia. The real cost is the difference between taking
care of a PVS patient versus taking care of a dementia patient.
12
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C. Some Philosophers in Favor of Euthanizing the
Profoundly Mentally Incapacitated
There may be moral issues which must be overcome
before society would be willing to start euthanizing those
who are considered "low quality." Thankfully,
philosophers and commentators have helped ease these
moral reservations.
Bruce Ackerman puts forward a conception of the
liberal theory of society.43 In this liberal society, a fetus is
not a citizen because it cannot participate in public
debate-going through a third party proxy does not count.
Ackerman's point focuses on political conversation and
participation in public discourse in which only some human
entities can participate. He states, "A liberal community
does not ask what a creature looks like before admitting it
to citizenship. Instead, it asks whether the creature can
play a part in the dialogic and behavioral transactions that
constitute a liberal policy. The fetus fails the dialogic
test-more plainly than do grown-up dolphins."
44
According to James Murray in his review of Ackerman's
book, "Ackerman's theory depends on the ability to assert
one's rights-a literal forensic aspect.",45  Murray also
argues that the "rights of the talking ape are more secure
than those of the human vegetable." 46  According to
Ackerman, citizenship has nothing to do with biology; it
43 See generally, BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JuSTiCE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE (Yale Univ. Press 1980).
44Id. at 127.
45 James R. Murray, Book Note, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 942, 955
(1983) (reviewing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JusTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE (Yale Univ. Press 1980)).
46 ACKERMAN, supra note 43, at 80.
13
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only has to do with politics. 47 Ackerman further contends
that those who cannot participate in the political process
are perhaps without protective rights. Thus, it relieves us
of the moral predicament of aborting fetuses and possibly
ending the lives of those that are profoundly mentally
incapacitated.48
Today's preeminent philosopher dealing with the
ethics of euthanasia is Peter Singer. Singer contends that
the quality of a living being's consciousness is what gives
its life value. The fact that a being is part of the species
Homo sapiens is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it;
"rather, characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self
consciousness [make] the difference." 49  According to
Singer, because infants, regardless of whether they are
disabled, and the profoundly mentally incapacitated lack
these characteristics, killing them cannot be equated with
killing normal human beings or any other conscious being
for that matter.5 0  Singer explains that the difference
between killing a disabled infant and a normal infant does
not lie in the fact that the normal infant has the potential to
be a self-conscious living being, but rather in the attitudes
of the parent. The "reason why it is normally a terrible
thing to kill an infant is the effect the killing will have on
its parents., 51 The most plausible reason for attributing a
right to life to a being applies only if there is "some
awareness of oneself as a being existing over time, or as a
4 7
1d.
48 Confessedly, I do not fully understand Ackerman's SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN THE LBERAL STATE. Its brief discussion is included because, from
what little I can gather, it seems relevant.
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continuing mental self."52  Because the profoundly
mentally incapacitated are by definition incapable of such
complex awareness, Singer sees no problem euthanizing
such individuals so long as there are no "extrinsic" reasons
for keeping them alive. This would include the emotional
anguish euthanasia would have on a PVS patient's loved
ones. Although it may still be wrong to kill a conscious
being that is not capable of rationality, autonomy, and self
consciousness if that being is likely to experience more
pleasure that pain,53 a PVS patient would likely not fall into
that category.5 4
Joseph Fletcher, a Protestant theologian and a
pioneer in the field of bioethics, has compiled a list of what
he calls "indicators of humanhood." The list includes: self
awareness, a sense of the future, a sense of the past, the
capacity to relate to others, concern for others,
communication, and curiosity. 55  Like Singer, Fletcher
argues that refusal "to approve of positively ending a
subhuman life",56 is absurd and that "mercy killing could be
52 Id. at 183. Singer wonders why it is morally wrong to kill, say, a PVS
patient but it is acceptable to kill a sentient animal. He says, "If we
compare a severely defective human infant with a nonhuman animal, a
dog or a pig, for example, we will often find the nonhuman to have
superior capacities, both actual and potential, for rationality, self-
consciousness, communication, and anything else that can plausibly be
considered morally significant." SINGER, supra note 10, at 201. Such
comparisons have made Peter Singer the target of much hatred. See,
e.g., Sylvia Nasar, Princeton's New Philosopher Draws a Stir, THE
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1999, at Al.
53 SINGER, supra note 49, at 101.
54 Singer asks if you would prefer an instant death or falling into a
coma for ten years followed by death. He suggests there is no reason
to pick the latter. See id. at 192.
55 Joseph Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of
Man, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 1-3 (1972).
56 Joseph Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, in To LIvE AND LET DIE:
15
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the right thing to do" in some circumstances where the
person to be killed is a "human vegetable, whether
spontaneously functioning or artificially supported." 
57
Included in the circumstances which would justify mercy
killing is the instance where one is considered
"progressively degraded while constantly eating up private
or public financial resources." 58 Fletcher has also argued
that if the life of a severely retarded baby can be ended
while still in the mother's womb through abortion, why can
it not be terminated just after birth? According to Fletcher,
The only difference between the fetus and
the infant is that the infant breathes with its
lungs. Does this make any significant
difference morally or from the point of view
of values? Surely not .... True guilt arises
only from an offense against a person, and
[an individual with Down's Syndrome] is
not a person. 59
By describing profoundly mentally incapacitated
individuals as subhuman, both Singer and Fletcher are able
to avoid moral impediments that stand in the way of
applying a strict utilitarian standard as to whether the
mentally incapacitated should live or die. Once the moral
hang-ups are out of the way, there is nothing stopping a
cost-benefit analysis of the lives of such afflicted
individuals. Because of this, it is not surprising that, for
Singer and Fletcher, the solution of euthanizing the
WHEN, WHY, AND How 116 (Robert H. Williams, ed., Springer-Verlag




59 Joseph Fletcher, The Right to Die: A Theologian Comments, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1968, at 62, 63-64.
16
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profoundly mentally incapacitated is an easy one, so long
as no one will miss them too much.
D. The "Life" and Death of Nancy Cruzan and
Terri Schiavo
In 1983, at the age of twenty-five, Nancy Cruzan
lost control of her car on a country road, was ejected, and
landed face down in a ditch filled with water. By the time
help arrived, she had been without oxygen for several
minutes. As a result, Nancy entered a persistent vegetative
state. Her brainstem remained sufficiently intact to keep
her body breathing without a respirator, but she could not
swallow. Food and water were fed to her through a tube
inserted into her nose running down to her stomach. Nancy
remained like this for eight years.
Nancy's parents, as her guardians, requested that
the hospital remove the feeding tube, which would lead to
Nancy's eventual death. The hospital refused, and
litigation began. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to
allow the removal of the feeding tube because Nancy was
not competent to refuse life-sustaining treatment herself.
60
The court could only give permission for the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment if there was clear and convincing
evidence that Nancy, while competent, would have wanted
life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn.6 1 So long as the
state was paying the tab for Nancy's care and the feeding
tube imposed no substantial burden, the legal presumption
remained "preserve life.",62  The Supreme Court of the
6°Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
6 1
id.
62 See id. at 419 ("The state's concern with the sanctity of life rests on
the principle that life is precious and worthy of preservation without
regard to its quality. This latter concern is especially important when
17
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United States granted certiorari and affirmed the Missouri
Supreme Court holding that each state can make its own
decision as to what should happen when an incompetent
person has not previously expressed her desire to refuse
treatment. 6 3 In reaching its decision, the Court accepted
the right of the state of Missouri to demand clear and
convincing evidence that it was what Nancy would have
wanted.
Nancy died a few months after the Supreme Court
decision was handed down when her feeding tube was
finally removed. In the end, it was removed after former
friends came out of the woodwork to say they remembered
Nancy had indicated to them that she wished to die if she
was ever in such a situation. This time the state of
Missouri allowed the feeding tube to be removed.64
What is the point? For seven of the eight years, it
was clear the Nancy would never emerge from her
vegetative state. The state of Missouri was paying
$130,000 a year to keep Nancy's body breathing.
Moreover, her parents were under extreme strain, as they
believed their daughter had died the day of the car crash.65
During the media frenzy that surrounded the case, Nancy's
father said, "It isn't my daughter (at the hospital). My
daughter's been gone for over 6 1/2 years and that is just
what is left of her."66  On a nationally televised news
considering a person who has lost the ability to direct her medical
treatment.").63 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
64 For an excellent account of Cruzan's story, see RICHARD EPSTEIN,
MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE, 347-49
(Addison-Wesley 1997); SINGER, supra note 10, at 60-63.
65 On Nancy's tombstone, the family engraved: Nancy Beth Cruzan -
Born July 20, 1957 - Departed Jan 11, 1983 - At Peace Dec 26, 1990.
See SINGER, supra note 10, at 62.
66 Robert Steinbrook, High Court to Rule on Halting Treatment:
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program, he stated, "My daughter died six years ago and
the state will not let us have a funeral." 67 No one wanted
Nancy's body to continue breathing indefinitely in a
permanent vegetative state except for the state of Missouri.
Just last year, the courts were called in again to
settle the fate of another woman in a permanent vegetative
state. This time the woman was Terri Schiavo and the facts
of the case were strikingly similar to those of the Nancy
Cruzan case. Terri was a young woman who, through an
unsettled accident, had oxygen cut off to her brain for a
prolonged period. Afterwards, the doctors rendered her
profoundly mentally incapacitated-a shadow of her
former self. Terri was somewhat more "alert" than Nancy.
Terri, unlike Nancy, was capable of breathing and
maintaining blood pressure, but still required a feeding tube
connected to her stomach to sustain life. Yet, the
similarities ended there.
No one but the state of Missouri wished to keep
Nancy alive in such a state. In the case of Terri, however,
her family fought to keep her alive, while her husband
fought to have the feeding tube removed.68 Because Terri
did not have a living will, 69 the case centered on who
should be able to decide Terri's fate: her husband, who
was her legal guardian, or her family.
For the purposes of this comment, the normative
Family's Rights at Heart of 'Right to Die' Question, L.A. TIMES, July
29, 1989, at 1.
67 CNBC Live (CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 31, 1989).
68 See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378
(M.D. Fla. 2005). Ultimately, Terr's parents petitioned the Supreme
Court but were denied relief. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo,
125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005).
69 The Schiavo case made people much more focused on the subject of
advanced directives, living wills, and estate planning in general. See
Tom Mighell, Estate Planning On The Web, 68 TEX. B.J. 384 (2005).
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question of who should decide the fate of someone who is
profoundly mentally incapacitated is irrelevant. The
interesting aspect of the Schiavo case is that her family
gained some utility from Terri's life, even though Terri no
longer could. This provides a much different situation than
Nancy's case where her family, friends, and husband
collectively wished to end her life. Terri's case is much
more difficult from an expected utility position. An
argument can be made that it is possible that the negative
utility experienced by her husband in having Terri hooked
up to the feeding tube was outweighed by the positive
utility experienced by her parents. Of course, no one will
ever know.
According to Richard Epstein, sustaining the life of
someone who is profoundly mentally incapacitated serves
no purpose. "The maxim, preserve life, only makes sense
when the expected utility of that life to the holder of that
life is positive., 70 The rule of continued treatment could
make sense when the powerful could take advantage of the
helpless. An example of this is when children take care of
their elderly parents. Epstein argues that the permanent
vegetative state is so different from all other ailments and
so irreversible, that it falls into a separate category of its
own. "A rule that said 'allow death in a permanent
vegetative state' could easily be adopted without sliding
down some slippery slope, so close is the permanent
vegetative state to clinical death., 71 "Choose life" makes
little sense when there is so little for which to live.
V. Rationale Against Terminating Low Quality Lives
7 0 EPSTEIN, supra note 64, at 348-49 (emphasis in original).
71 id.
20
2:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 104
A. A Law and Economics Rationale
Compelling law and economics arguments exist
against allowing doctors to perform euthanasia-voluntary
or not. The Hippocratic Oath, which all physicians accept,
requires doctors to "neither give a deadly drug to anybody
who asked for it, nor . . . make a suggestion to this
effect." 72 The Hippocratic Oath makes economic sense, as
it ostensibly guarantees that doctors will act as faithful
agents of the patient's interest. If a patient is willing to pay
up to $50 for an educated diagnosis, but is fearful the
doctor may prescribe unnecessary surgery, a bargain may
not be reached even if the doctor offers his services for less
than $50. This is where the Hippocratic Oath comes in.
Physicians get more business because sick people will be
less inclined to practice home remedies or seek out quacks.
In turn, patients will receive better care because they will
be treated by medical experts. "Both physicians and
patients would be better off if patients could place a high
degree of trust in their doctors because the absence of such
trust will prevent many mutually beneficial bargains from
being reached.,
73
Giving patients the well-informed option to accept
euthanasia does not alleviate all the aforementioned
problems. Patients will still need to take costly precautions
against doctors. Patients will still require protection from
family members who can pressure the sick and dying into
an early demise so that economic costs, such as costly
medicine, can be lowered and financial gains, such as
72 Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation, and
Interpretation 3 (Henry E. Sigerist ed., John Hopkins Press 1943).
73 See Nelson Lund, Two Precipices, One Chasm: The Economics Of
Physician-Assisted Suicide And Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
903, 907-08 (1997).
21
2:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 105
insurance policies, realized. Even if it is solely the
patient's choice, doctors are experts in framing options to
guarantee certain outcomes. Imagine being confronted
with the question of "agonizing death" versus "gentle quick
release." Because of this, the argument goes, the practice
of physician-assisted suicide erodes the trust that patients
give doctors and, therefore, increases costs. Many argue
that this is not simply "a moral nicety," but rather a
valuable device for reducing agency costs by diminishing
the need for patients to take costly steps to monitor their
doctors to ensure they are acting in the patient's best
interest. 
74
While the above argument may apply to those that
are still conscious or have a glimmer of hope of one day
becoming conscious, it is not clear whether it extends to
those in a permanent vegetative state or those that are
profoundly mentally disabled. Nelson Lund argues that
once physicians begin assisting in "mercy killings" of those
competent to give consent, it will become unbearably
tempting for physicians to euthanize the most
"dehumanized., 75  Here Lund's argument goes awry
because his leap from the practice of voluntary euthanasia
to the practice of non-voluntary euthanasia is shaky. He
appeals only to human nature by claiming that doctors
simply will not be able to control themselves.
Epstein argues that "state intervention must be used
to preserve lives known to be worth living," but that "when
life is hopeless or inert, the guardian [should have] the
right, to see that the life ends; and if active euthanasia is the
best means to achieve that end, so be it." 76  When a
patient's prognosis is unclear, imperfect utilitarian
74 See id. at 935.751 d. at 919.
76 EPSTEIN, supra note 64, at 358.
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judgments are inescapable and the patient must be
protected. But when there is no hope of recovery, the lives
of those "haunted by pain of doomed to eerie silence"
should not be preserved so long as the patient's guardian
does not object.77 Lund contends that the guardians should
never have the right to pull the plug no matter how bleak
the prognosis. Therefore, Lund takes issue with Epstein's
argument as well.
B. Accuracy of Assessment Problems
But why not euthanize the PVS patient who, by
definition, has no hope of recovery? For one reason, there
could to be an accuracy problem in the assessment of those
who truly are in a permanent vegetative state, as people
who have been diagnosed as PVS sometimes "come back
to life."
Carrie Coons, an eighty-six year-old woman entered
a hospital after a massive stroke. Initially able to speak, she
quickly deteriorated into what was diagnosed as PVS.
Coons's sister maintained that Coons would not wish to be
kept in this condition and petitioned the court to remove the
feeding tube. The court accepted this wish and allowed the
hospital to remove the tube. 78  Before the tube was
removed, however, Coons woke up and began eating and
speaking. This case illustrates both the imprecision of
medical judgment and the dangers inherent in allocating the
choice of life or death to family members. Apparently
people sometimes come out of a seemingly permanent
77 Id. Ignoring the thorny issue of guardianship, this is in stark contrast
to the Schiavo case where her parents emphatically wished to keep her
alive.
78 In re Gannon, No. 0189-017460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 14, 1989).
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vegetative state. 79
Even more frightening is the possibility that PVS
patients are actually awake on the inside even though they
appear dead to the world. An accuracy problem would also
arise in being able to assess what it is like to be in a
permanent vegetative state. Some claim that patients in a
permanent vegetative state often experience periods of
wakefulness. Evidence shows that some patients who
appear to be unconscious for extended periods of time and
unresponsive to external stimuli report, upon recovery, that
they had in fact been conscious even though they were
incapable of showing any signs of awareness. 81 When the
feeding tubes are removed from a PVS patient who is able
to breathe on his own, he starves to death over a period of
days-a terrifying thought if the patient is awake on the
inside, but unable to scream for help.
Further, studies show that happiness is relative.
From the perspective of being healthy and normal, it is easy
to pity those with severe ailments and question why they
would want to live. But it is clear that people with Down's
syndrome, for example, are capable of experiencing more
pleasure than pain. In a 1978 study of the happiness of
severe accident victims and lottery winners, researchers
79 See, e.g., Harvey S. Levin et al., Vegetative State After Closed Head-
Injury: A Traumatic Coma Data Bank Report, 48 ARCHIvEs OF
NEUROLOGY 580 (1991) ("Of 84 patients in the vegetative state who
provided follow-up data, 41% became conscious by 6 months, 52%
regained consciousness by 1 year, and 58% recovered consciousness
within the 3 year follow-up interval.") Id. at 584.
8° Lund, supra note 73, at 940-41 (citing Marcia Angell, After Quinlan:
The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1524, 1525 (1994)).
81id.
82 SINGER, supra note 49, at 187 ("Down's Syndrome is [not] so
crippling as to make life not worth living.") Id.
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found that paraplegics adapt better than most would
expect. 83 The immediate effect of becoming physically
challenged was extreme unhappiness and the immediate
effect of winning the lottery was extreme joy. After several
years, however, the happiness rates leveled off to
essentially the pre-accident and pre-winning-the-lottery
happiness levels. 84  "Perhaps people, through coping
mechanisms, are able to adapt to disease better than they
anticipated in advance." 85 Because of this, policy-makers
will likely fail to predict the utility of those they deem to
have a low quality life. Thus, line-drawing errors are
inescapable.
C. Intuitions and Biological Reasons Behind the
Sanctity Of Life
Judge Richard Posner argues that, for better or
worse, we have unshakable intuitions about the sanctity of
human life. Posner writes, "These intuitions precede and
inform, rather than following and being informed by,
philosophical analysis of personhood. ' ,86 For some reason,
we have intuitions that infanticide, enforcing suicide
contracts, and euthanizing the profoundly mentally disabled
are wrong. Posner claims that these intuitions stand or fall
on "whether a monkey or a computer should be deemed
more of a person than a severely demented or profoundly
83 Phillip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is
Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 917
(1978).
4 Id.
"Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law And Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1542 (1998).
86 POSNER, supra note 19, at 257.
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retarded human being." 87 Accordingly, we will make no
progress because of our immovable intuitions concerning
the "priority of human beings over machines and
animals."88  "At the bottom we test our theories by
reference to our intuitions, the things we cannot help
believing."
8 9
One possible reason for valuing all human life is
that humans gain pleasure from being part of a society that
takes care of its disadvantaged people. During times of
scarcity, primitive humans were forced to kill or let the
weakest members of their community die.9° Consequently,
only the wealthiest communities were capable of ensuring
that their sick and elderly survived the scarce times. The
weakest members acted as a buffer. Surely the
communities might have more food or resources without
the sick, elderly, or disabled, but without them, the healthy
would be the next to go. Evolutionarily, humans may gain
pleasure from being part of a society that is able to
maintain its sick and disabled. It is a survival instinct.
This may explain our "objective moral view of our
obligation to cherish, preserve, and protect even the most
humble examples of [human life]." Intuition can be a
powerful guide in answering ethical questions.
Further, euthanizing humans deemed to be of low
quality may be a problem for the risk averse. A possible
objection to this form of euthanasia is that it would lead to




89 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 340 (1990).
90 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
91 Scott Pruett, Personhood: The Measure of Life, available at
http://www.lifeway.com/lwc/articlemain_page/0, 1703,A%253D 15622
3%2526M%253D200166,00.html (discussing Singers position).
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might, come within its scope. 92 As mentioned above,
patients would become ever vigilant of their doctors as they
became infirmed-always afraid that the next injection or
pill would be the last.
D. Incommensurability and the Cost of Costing
Hidden within the rational economic choice to
euthanize those individuals deemed low quality is the harm
from the comparison of incommensurable goods, or what
Calabresi and Bobbitt have called "the costs of 
costing." 93
Incommensurability occurs when aligning goods along a
single metric offends our judgment about how these goods
should be characterized. The single metric is, of course,
usually money. Using the market to determine the price of
certain things causes an affront to our values, for example,
"of market determinations that say or imply that the value
of a life or of some precious activity integral to life is
reducible to a money figure." 94 Calabresi and Bobbit use
the example of slavery noting that "[t]he social costs of
indentured labor . . . surely includes one's outrage at
inducing the poor to sell themselves, and this cost must be
considered before the society allows peonage."
95
So even if we are prepared to engage in the
dialogue of whose life is worthless and begin the
calculations to determine who should be euthanized, it
seems that we will fail to arrive at the correct valuation.
First, certain variables will be left out of the equation
altogether because pricing incommensurable goods causes
92 SINGER, supra note 49, at 192.
93 See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHiLIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 32
(Norton & Co. 1978).
94Id.
9' Id. at 33.
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immediate "violence to our considered judgments,"
"affront to values," and societal outrage. 96 Second, even if
we attempt to measure these missing variables, some are
incapable of sufficiently precise calculation. "Attempts to
weigh precisely the social costs and benefits associated
with different responses to a tragic choice result more often
in the valuation of only what we can measure than in the
measurement of all that we can value."
97
When the decision to euthanize low quality lives is
made, there is still another variable that must be calculated.
"[O]ur lives and institutions depend on the notion that life
is beyond price." 98 A refusal to save lives or an affirmative
choice to end lives is horribly costly. For example, life
insurance policies are routinely taken out on coal miners
for several hundred thousand dollars; but when the mine
collapses, the authorities are willing to spend millions to
save a single miner.99 Being able to hold on to the ideal
that all life is priceless, in itself, has value. Even if the
decision to terminate a low quality life would be cost
effective in the short run, it almost certainly will not be in
the long run.
V. Conclusion
96Id. at 204 n.15 ("Costs which are difficult to measure, such as the
affront to the value of human life entailed by a decision to authorize
medical experimentation with the terminally ill, will often be left out of
the accounting altogether, though the resulting narrowness of the
premises will poison the conclusion."). See also Laurence H. Tribe,
Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
97 See CALABREsI & BOBBrr, supra note 93, at 204.
98 Id. at 39.
99 See id. ("A fortune may be spent to save a convict caught in a
jailhouse fire.")
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On its face, the notion of euthanizing society's
weakest and most unproductive individuals appears to
make strict economic sense. Once other factors are
introduced, however, not only does it become clear that
such a policy does not make economic sense, but also that
it is a notion we do not even want to entertain. As for those
individuals in a permanent vegetative state, the rationale
for not terminating their lives does not fit as nicely. As
Peter Singer, Richard Epstein, and others have argued,
there seems to be no difference between dying and being in
a permanent vegetative state. Perhaps the issue lies with
revamping the clinical definition of "death," which some
doctors have proposed should encompass people who are in
a permanent vegetative state.
100
'0o Dr. Marcia Angell, Executive Editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, has proposed that death should be redefined to include
permanent vegetative states and that food should be withheld from the
"dead" person until the heart and lungs stop. See Marcia Angell, After
Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1524 (1994).
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lmites der 11SOD
Poster reads: "This person suffering from hereditary defects
costs the people 60,000 Reichmarks during his lifetime.
People, that is your money."
101 Wikipedia Encyclopedia, T-4 Euthanasia Program, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:EnthanasiePropaganda.jpg (last
visited Dec. 23, 2004).
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